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A people-state negotiation in a borderland
A case study of the Indonesia–Malaysia frontier 
in Sebatik Island
LINA PURYANTI AND SARKAWI B. HUSAIN
Abstract
This paper aims to show the dynamics of the Indonesian – Malaysian border area 
in Sebatik Island, East Kalimantan, Indonesia. Take into account as a background 
is the territorial dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia over the Ligitan and 
Sipadan Islands which were awarded to Malaysia by the decision of the ICJ 
(International Court of Justice) in 2002, which was followed by the dispute over 
the Ambalat sea block in 2005. Sebatik Island is geographically very strategic since 
it faces the disputed areas. Therefore the concerns of the Indonesian state with 
regard to the island pertain to issues of nation-state sovereignty and territorial 
security, which she tries to safeguard through intensive campaigns. Research 
conducted in Sebatik in 2009 showed how people willingly reinforced the state 
by incorporating its programs, despite their ambiguous position as people in a 
border area, which support they used subsequently in negotiating with the state 
for their own local purpose.  
Keywords
sebatik Island, borderland, negotiation, local people, state.
Introduction
“Our sovereignty over Ambalat is the bottom line”1
(President Yudhoyono, Kompas 3 June 2009)
1  “Daulat Ambalat Harga Mati”.
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“Actually if it is said that we are about to take up arms against Malaysia, I don’t 
know, that may be just politics, while we are here living in peace and keep good 
relations with the Malaysians for our life here depends on Malaysia. It remains 
for the Indonesian Government to decide how to offer facilities instead of creating 
barriers. The ringgit cannot simply be eliminated either, for it is basically just like in 
Jakarta where you can also pay with American dollars. The most important thing 
is the future of our fellow citizens who find themselves in the front line. For it is 
uncertain whether the rupiah can be brought back to life and
the ringgit be made hated.”2 
(Interview with Pak Zainuddin, the village head of Haji Kuning)
“Consolidate the Red and White Flag on the Border”3
(An inscription on a new border marker in the village of Haji Kuning)
How these three border narratives help us understand the process of negotiation 
between the state and the people in a context of the nation-state sovereignty?
The quoted narratives and the questions they arose came from a short 
preliminary research in Sebatik Island, a border area of Indonesia with 
Malaysia in East Kalimantan, Indonesia, during August 2009. The quotations 
are respectively (1) a statement from the President of the Republic of Indonesia, 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, regarding the conflict with Malaysia on the 
Ambalat sea block in 2009, (2) part of an interview with the head of Haji Kuning 
Village, which illustrates the unique relation of the Indonesian Sebatiks vis-à-
vis the neighbouring state of Malaysia in the contiguous border area, and (3) 
an inscription on a new border marker that was constructed and inaugurated 
on the celebration of the Indonesia’s 64th Independence Day on 17 August 
2009 in Haji Kuning, a village on the border between both countries.
The narratives are from Sebatik in 2009 against the backdrop of heightened 
tensions between Indonesia and Malaysia because of their territorial disputes 
after the “loss” of the Ligitan and Sipadan Islands in 2002, that was followed 
by the Ambalat sea block dispute in 2005. The island itself is geographically 
very strategic, since the argument of the Indonesia government for keeping 
the sovereignty over the Ligitan and Sipadan Islands was based on the 
continuation of the line which divided Sebatik Island into a Malaysian and an 
Indonesian half. The position of Sebatik Island is also strategic since it is facing 
the disputed Ambalat sea block. Preceding the disputes the presence of the 
state in its borderland could hardly be noticed, but the issues caused Sebatik 
Island to enter a new phase of statehood by intensive exposure to the state’s 
symbols and narratives. The state that had been so long absent in the daily lives 
2  “Sebenarnya kalau ada berita yang katanya kita mau mengangkat senjata dengan 
Malaysia, saya tidak tahu itu mungkin politik, sedangkan kita di sini aman-aman saja, menjaga 
persahabatan, karena hidup kita di sini itu kan karena Malaysia. Tinggal pemerintah bagaimana 
memberi kemudahan, jangan malah disusahkan. Tidak boleh pula dihapuskan ringgit, karena 
kan sama saja sebenarnya dengan di Jakarta, di sana juga berlaku dollar amerika. Yang lebih 
penting bagaimana nasib saudara kita yang berada di ujung tombak. Karena belum tentu kita 
bisa menghidupkan rupiah dan membenci ringgit”.
3  “Kokohkan Merah Putih di Tapal Batas”.
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of the Sebatiks now became present among the people through slogans such 
as nation-state sovereignty, national pride, territoriality, etcetera. At the same 
time, the lives of the Sebatik people had always been connected to Malaysia, 
especially to Tawau (Sabah), through its economic relations and cultural ties 
(ethnic proximity). The new situation evoked various responses among the 
people, ranging from resistance to support for the state’s campaigns.         
To explore the issue, the present paper will present portrays of three 
border villages in Sebatik Island namely Liyang Bunyu, Sungai Pancang, 
and Haji Kuning. At the state level the focus of this paper will be the state’s 
programs implemented on the island, especially those related to the issue 
of sovereignty, and the responses of the local people to these programs, as a 
form of negotiation.     
Sebatiks border economy
Sebatik Island is an island situated off the eastern coast of Kalimantan, and 
located at latitude 4° 10’ 1” North and longitude 117° 45’ 0” East. It is bisected 
at roughly 4° 10’ North by the Indonesian-Malaysian border (Map 1). The 
island lies between Tawau Bay (Teluk Tawau) to the north, Sulawesi Straits 
to the east, and Sebuku Bay (Teluk Sebuku) to the south. To the west the 
island faces Nunukan Island (Nunukan subdistrict, East Kalimantan province, 
Indonesia). The Northern part of the island belongs to Sabah-Malaysia. The 
southern part to Indonesia. 
Indonesian Sebatik is administratively divided into two subdistricts namely 
Kecamatan Sebatik Induk and Kecamatan Sebatik Barat. Kecamatan Sebatik 
Induk is located in the west (facing Nunukan), while Kecamatan Sebatik Barat 
is in the east (facing Tawau, Malaysia). The size of the combined subdistricts 
Sebatik Barat and Sebatik Induk is 24,371 ha. The centres of activity are the 
villages of Sungai Pancang in Sebatik Barat and Setabu in Sebatik Timur. 
Map 1. Sebatik Island (Google 2011).
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Economic activities are largely based on agriculture and forestry: padi (1.282 
ha); plantation (cacao 9.262 ha, coconut 535 ha, coffee 204 ha, cloves 14,5 ha, 
pepper 12 ha); and palm oil.4 Besides there are about 1.800 people who are 
working as fishermen in Sebatik. Most of the trading activities with Malaysia 
take place through the ports in Sebatik, such as Haji Kuning in the village of 
that name, Lalosalo in Sungai Pancang, or Se Nyamuk in Senyamuk Village. 
Three villages in Sebatik Island have direct borders with Malaysia, namely 
Liyang Bunyu, Sungai Pancang, and Haji Kuning. 
Liyang Bunyu: “friendly” border-crossings 
The village of Liang Bunyu is special in that one of its neighbourhood 
associations (Rukun Tetangga/RT), Bambangan, lies directly on the border 
with Malaysia. In this site, many villagers, beside those who are working as 
farmers, are working for palm oil plantations in Malaysia. Daily, the plantation 
workers move back and forth across the border without having any sense of 
crossing state borders or having to pass international immigration procedures 
like people have to do when they leave or enter modern states. What was 
understood as a borderline for the people, as it was shown by the villagers 
who accompanied us, was just a small river with some fallen bamboo trees 
as the (natural) border without any clear official signs. On the pathways to 
the plantation, the people have to pass an Indonesian army military post (Pos 
Pam Perbatasan Indonesia - Malaysia Yonif 613/RJA). However, the post is not 
influencing their daily border-crossing activities. The post (soldiers) never 
made that activity become complicated nor did they spread fear among the 
people. 
On the day we visited the site, we met the soldiers and the commander, 
Letnan Tony, a young soldier of 24. He told us that the military duties of the 
post, among other things, were guarding the official border piles (whose 
positions were mostly far away in the hilly jungle and far from people’s 
observation), preventing illegal logging5, and (probably) smuggling. These 
three duties actually are very crucial in a borderland like Sebatik. In 2009, 
for example, there was a case when the post caught subsidised Indonesian 
medicines which were smuggled to Malaysia. As regards the piles, the soldiers 
had to react on rumours that the people from the other side of the border had 
moved the piles in order to extend their land area, rumours that were quite 
strong in Sebatik. In their daily routine the soldiers were also involved with the 
4  During our preliminary research, the people explained that palm oil plantation in 
Sebatik Malaysia had been managed in modern ways for many years and had given very good 
economic results for the country. Most of the Malaysian plantation workers are Indonesian, 
including Sebatiks. In Indonesian Sebatik on the other hand, palm oil trees are not well taken 
care of, or grow wild in the people’s gardens or in the forest. In recent years, people become 
aware of the high economic benefits of palm oil and become more serious in cultivating the 
commodity.      
5  The fact that in Sebatik Island the issue of illegal logging is also very critical can be 
seen from the government’s  designation of 400 ha of forest in Liyang Bunyu as a protected 
forest (hutan lindung).
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villagers’ activities like sports, religious observances, and festivals, or mingled 
with people in warung kopi (small food and coffee stalls). This involvement 
caused the soldiers to be quite close to and accepted by the local population. 
The combination of fulfilling their military duties and seeking 
rapprochement with the villagers was not without ulterior motives. The 
existence of the military post in that borderline functioned as a symbol or 
empirical manifestation of state power and territoriality (Paasi 2010: 669). 
The approach of the military, for example, was meant to facilitate control of 
the population, whose loyalty was possibly ambiguous as a result of their 
intensive relations with the neighbouring state. The commander said that in 
their involvement with the people, they often referred to the importance of 
being loyal to the state and to keep up patriotic or nationalist values among 
them. As it seemed the army’s approach to the people was successful. From 
the people’s point of view the situation was not perceived as uncomfortable. 
In a conversation with some of the villagers at a warung kopi they said that 
they were not afraid or wanted to avoid the post; some of them even had made 
friends with the soldiers. We even got the impression that the interaction with 
the soldiers as a symbol of the government seemed to affirm one’s status and 
position vis-à-vis the state (Amster 2005: 37). One of the villagers very proudly 
said that he often came to the post and chatted with the soldiers. On a “formal 
level”, the villagers understood that the only problem with the soldiers was 
when they broke the state laws, for instance when they were involved in 
smuggling or illegal logging.6 This attitude was possibly caused by some 
“bad” experiences with Malaysia in recent years, which had influenced their 
perception toward the presence of the army.7 For the people, the military post 
as the state’s guardian or the symbol of state sovereignty also functioned as 
guardian for the security of the villagers. In other words, in Liyang Bunyu, 
the presence of the military enabled “friendly” border-crossing for the local 
people. 
The village of Sungai Pancang: fears of Malaysian 
intrusion, but ...
Sungai Pancang is also one of the villages located directly adjacent to Malaysia. 
In the village, some of the families in Rukun Tetangga (RT) 11 - Sungai Melayu 
- actually had been living in Malaysian Sebatik for almost thirty years, without 
even knowing that the place was not part of Indonesia. They became surprised 
when in 2009 the Malaysian Government issued a policy to develop the 
area by constructing a “for free” housing complex consisting of 300 houses 
for Malaysians. Mama Hamra, 54 years old, one of the settlers who was 
interviewed on 15 August 2009 said that in the beginning of the settlement 
6  Smuggling as an offence to the state laws will be dealt with in the next section
7  Stories of bad or harsh treatments from Malaysian police towards the illegal workers 
in that site were very common in Sebatik. The people said that if there were enough jobs and 
good wages for them in Indonesia they wouldn’t go to Malaysia for working. Some of them 
even decided not to continue working in Malaysia after those bad experiences.  
110 111Wacana, Vol. 13 No. 1 (April 2011) LINA PURYANTI AND SARKAWI B. HUSAIN, A people-state negotiation
about thirty years ago, the settlers did not realize that they were in another 
country. They resided on the land because their family in that village (who 
also did not really understand the borders of the land) told them that the area 
was free as it was just swamps and teeming with wild animals. Since then, 
the community had lived there for over thirty years as caretakers of salt fish 
ponds or as fishermen. Therefore, when the border issue became acute and 
Malaysia started its housing project in 2009, the families that did not have 
land in Indonesian Sebatik had problems to resettle.
Mama Hamra said that first (2009) the Malaysia government still let the 
families stay on the land. However, when we were on the site we found some 
boards attached to the new houses that stated: Hanya untuk orang Melayu 
(Only for the Malay), which was supported by the erection of the Malay flag 
on the site. In addition, the existence of a Malaysian Navy post at the coast on 
the edge of the area as a symbol of its being Malaysian territory contributed 
significantly to the aggravation of the atmosphere. Mama Hamra’s modest 
house, surrounded as it was by the symbols of the foreign state, made her 
and other people who had the same problem feel threatened: they feared that 
at any moment they could be expelled from their homes and their land. The 
people of Sungai Pancang on the Indonesian side really sympathized with 
the fate of their folks who had lived on Malaysian soil for such a long time, 
even though they knew that Malaysia was in its right, as it was developing the 
project on its own soil. However, the location being adjacent to their village 
raised fears of Malaysian intrusion. 
However, the uncomfortable situation in RT Sungai Melayu was 
completely different from the one in Lalosalo (River Way), the traditional 
harbour of the village. This harbour was one of the gateways to Tawau. Every 
morning, through the harbour many machine boats, fully loaded with palm oil, 
cocoa, bananas and other crash crops took off from Sebatik. On their way back 
in the evening, the boats carried Malaysian commodities needed by Sebatiks 
like sugar, gas, rice, electronic devices, etcetera. The goods were gotten from 
Tawau at cheaper prices and in a shorter time than would have been needed 
to bring them from Nunukan or other parts of Indonesia. In general, it may 
be said that the activities in the harbour reflected the economy of the village 
which in its turn reflected the economic situation of the island. 
Nonetheless, with these rapid trading connections between the people 
on Sebatik with their partners in neighbouring Malaysia, the issue of open 
smuggling was rampant in Sebatik. Subsidized commodities from each 
country, for example, were popular as contraband. It was common to find 
Malaysian subsidized goods traded in Indonesian Sebatik, while Indonesian 
subsidized commodities that were certainly restricted for being traded 
overseas were sent to Malaysia. It is not amazing therefore that Lalosalo 
harbour and other harbours in Sebatik have become gateways for smugglers. 
However, it is too easy to apply the common notion of smuggling in order to 
understand the situation in a borderland area such as Sebatik. The practice of 
border-crossing which is considered acceptable (licit) by the local population, 
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is, more often than not, declared illegal by the state. “It may not always be 
possible to attribute a single category of ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ to practices and 
flows across borders, as border people constantly weave their way in and 
out of intersecting and often ill-defined spheres of legality and illegality” 
(Eilenberg and Wadley 2009: 59). Transnational practices that are considered 
acceptable (licit) by participants are often illegal in the formal sense since it 
is very common and open, and not such a secretive activity (in Van Schendel 
and Abraham 2005: 36-68). For the people, having this relation was part of 
their daily life and not considered offensive to the state laws. How easily they 
passed the customs also showed how even for the state agents the criteria of 
legality or illegality were “flexible” in local practice.
The village of Haji Kuning: a frontier village
In Haji Kuning, there was a house that was rather unique. It was built exactly 
on the international border between the two states; the family’s living room 
was located in Indonesia while the kitchen was on Malaysian soil (see Picture 
1). Mappangara (44 years old), the owner of the house, said that when the 
house was built he knew that it was on the borderline, but since there were no 
formal prohibitions from the Indonesian and Malaysian governments or from 
the owner of the land in Tawau from whom he had rented it, he continued to 
live in his house until today. Apart from Mappangara’s house there were five 
other houses in a similar situation without there being any serious attention 
from the side of the government either. In other words, the two states did 
not make a problem of it. Actually, in a borderland situation in which the 
populations who are residing on each side of the border are ethnically the 
Picture 1. the Mappangara’s house (Photograph by the author, 2009).
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same, what happened with Mappangara’s house was not extraordinary. A 
good relationship between Mappangara and the owner of the land in Tawau 
was based on their common Buginese ethnic background. This appeared to 
be more important than the citizenship difference or the complicated formal 
procedure of concluding a transnational contract. Thus the partitioned peoples 
of these borderlands are continually involved in practices that transcended 
the territorial boundary of the state, keeping tight relations with people on 
the other side (Eilenberg and Wadley 2009: 58). However, at the state level, 
the policy of the two states of seemingly ignoring the case was in fact rather 
strange. Both Indonesia and Malaysia usually regard boundary issues between 
the two countries as quite serious. Despite their harmonious relationship as 
bangsa serumpun (people of the same race), the history of both states has been 
marked by “ups and downs” with regard to such issues. But in local practice, 
the states’ representatives in the island may assume that the Mappangara’s 
house won’t be a serious problem, since the parties involved respect each 
other and do not present a threat for the security or sovereignty of either 
state. Cultural ties between Mappangara and the land owner and also among 
the state’s agents from the two countries appear to be determining for this 
situation.  
Like Lalosalo harbour, Haji Kuning is also a gateway for consumer goods 
from and to Sebatik. When we asked some people at the harbour whether 
they provided their trading goods with documents, they said “yes”. But at the 
same time we got the information from other informants that they sometimes 
ignored the document procedures because of their “good relations” with the 
state agents (the customs officers on the Indonesian and Malaysian sides) and 
also with their partners in Tawau. Sometimes when they were in a hurry or just 
wanted to avoid the immigration procedures, they would leave the harbour 
much earlier in the morning before 7.00 o’clock A.M. when the customs office 
opened. Such practices were very common in Haji Kuning. 
Whereas in Liyang Bunyu the practice of border-crossing with “no official 
document” was common, in Sungai Pancang and Haji Kuning border traffic 
was allowed to those who owned a special pass (Pas Lintas Batas / PLB), locally 
known as surat merah (red document) or buku merah (red booklet) because of 
its red coloured cover. The PLB is actually the result of the Basic Agreement 
of 1967 between Malaysia and Indonesia, a Memorandum of Understanding, 
valid for their border areas and intended for non-work-related or social visits. 
With such a pass, the Indonesian inhabitants of Sebatik are allowed to enter 
Tawau through the Tawau harbour and to stay there for four hours. Only the 
people in possession of a PLB take off from one of Sebatik’s harbours while 
bearers of international passports have to depart from Nunukan. In practice, 
it is very hard to visit Tawau for only four hours since about two hours are 
needed for immigration processing in the harbour. Therefore the people have 
to conduct all business in Tawau in a rush. Sometimes a little money (uang 
sogok) for the officials in Tawau would help to let them stay longer than just 
four hours. Often the Tawau immigration officers seemed to deliberately tarry 
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serving the visitors. They had to wait long while the officers were chatting 
inside their office.
The border-crossing situation in these three villages shows how people 
in that open environment are constantly exposed to foreign values, ideas, 
customs, traditions, institutions, tastes, and behaviour (Martinez 1994: 10). In 
these villages as well as in the other Sebatik villages not directly bordering 
on Malaysia, the Malaysian ringgit next to the Indonesian rupiah is common 
currency in trading transactions. When trading in rupiah, for example, a seller 
would change the currency without taking care of actual exchange rates. The 
identity as border people is also strongly reflected in language use. In their 
daily life, for example, the people easily switch from their native language 
(Tidung, Bugis, Timor, and Buton)8 to Malay. However, proper Bahasa 
Indonesia is rarely used as their daily spoken language. Sebatik people 
commonly visit Tawau for a variety of reasons: visiting relatives (the people 
in Sebatik and Tawau are mostly Bugis, or have a Buginese background), 
shopping, working, and for medical examinations.
Sebatik is also an example of an economic symbiotic asymmetric 
interdependence border region, or to put it more simply an interdependent 
borderland (Martinez 1994: 8). The interdependence is asymmetric because 
Tawau is the only destination for trading Sebatik agriculture or agroforestry 
products and in many cases the Sebatiks (fishermen, farmers, and the local 
entrepreneurs) are also financed by Tawau’s entrepreneurs. Moreover, 
the bargaining position of the Sebatiks is very weak since the prices of the 
commodities are completely controlled by the Tawau economic market. It is 
rather ironic because the life of Tawau in general dependent on supply from 
Sebatik. Conversely, for their daily needs that cannot be procured by the island 
itself the people of Indonesian Sebatik are almost completely dependent on 
the supply from Tawau, since there is no alternative choice. Trading with 
Tawau guarantees them more stable prices compared to what they would 
get by sending the commodities to Nunukan or Tarakan. Therefore, even 
though economically Tawau is more dominant and stronger than Sebatik, for 
most of the people in the island the economic relationship with neighbouring 
Malaysia is crucial. 
At the state level
In discussing the government policies towards the border zones, Tirtosudarmo 
(2007: 3) explains how Indonesia’s frontier areas generally were marginalized 
economically and never were considered zones worth taking serious care 
of, despite their strategic position vis-à-vis the neighbouring countries. 
The national media, for example, have described the lack of good roads 
connecting the border area with the rest of the province as the main reason 
why border communities are less directed towards their own community 
8  Besides Tidung and Bugis (the majority) ethnics, the island is also settled by Timor 
and Buton ethnics. 
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than to neighbouring Malaysia (Kompas 20019 through Eilenberg and Wadley 
2009: 61). A significant change in the government‘s policy vis-à-vis the 
border areas can be seen during the Megawati period. The Director General 
of Environmental Planning organized land use development in the border 
zone named KASABA (Kalimantan – Sarawak - Sabah). One of the aims of 
the President’s decision regarding land use along the border (seventh draft, 
16 October 2003, Article 2) was to turn the area from a peripheral backwater 
into the “front gallery” of the nation (Direktorat Jenderal Penataan Ruang 
2003: 18). The border zone was identified as covering five districts in West 
Kalimantan and three in East Kalimantan. It was described as a backward, 
remote area, lacking in transportation facilities and access to information. A 
low population density, poor facilities for health and education, and high 
labour mobility were seen as characteristic, while the community’s economy 
was described as “nomadic farming” (ladang berpindah). Six main problems 
were identified: economic disparity between Malaysia and Indonesia, illegal 
Indonesian labour flow, especially through Nunukan, destruction of Indonesia’s 
protected forest, shifting of the border markers, weak customs facilities that 
encouraged smuggling, and weak infrastructure which kept border areas 
isolated (Direktorat Jenderal Penataan Ruang 2003: 12 through Potter 2009: 96). 
The situation in Sebatik Island is not much different from the underdeveloped 
situation identified as problematic in other border areas of Indonesia. With the 
exception of Haji Kuning, Sungai Pancang, and Senyamuk that have direct 
access for transnational trading with Malaysia, the villages in Sebatik can 
indeed be considered “a backward, remote area, lacking in transportation 
and access to information”. It is much easier for people in Sebatik to get their 
daily needs from Tawau instead of  from Nunukan, both in terms of distance 
and price. It is easier for them to get complicated medical service that is not 
locally available by going to Tawau instead of to Nunukan. In a conversation 
with some Junior high school students in Sebatik, when the question was about 
their hopes for Sebatik in the future, their answers were the same: “We want 
Sebatik to become like Tawau”. They did not mention Nunukan or Tarakan, 
or even Jakarta as the symbol of development. Their local orientation for a 
bright future was towards Tawau, because of its accessibility, whereas the 
modern cities in Indonesia are far away and beyond their imagination. 
Up to the court cases with Malaysia resulting in the “loss” of Ligitan and 
Sipadan Islands in 2002 and the subsequent conflict on the Ambalat sea block 
in 2005, awareness of the Indonesian state was only mute. The state seemed to 
be absent in Sebatik as regards care for its people’s well-being. In most of their 
activities the people were dependent on and in contact with their Malaysian 
neighbours, rather than with their fellow Indonesians. The succession of 
presidents over the years did not bring significant changes in people’s lives. 
They only received some  minor fringe benefits from the state’s development 
projects. 
9  “Jalan rusak, isolasi fisik makin parah” (Roads are ruined, physical isolation is getting 
ever worse, Kompas online, 8 June 2010).
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The influence for Sebatik of the Ligitan and Sipadan 
islands lawsuit and the Ambalat sea block dispute 
The border between Indonesia and Malaysia in Kalimantan (Borneo) is a 
legacy from the colonial period, being the outcome of the 1891 Convention 
between the Netherlands and Great Britain. According to this agreement the 
northern part of Borneo belonged to Great Britain and the southern part to 
the Netherlands. With independence, Malaysia became the successor of Great 
Britain and Indonesia of the Netherlands. As a consequence, in defining their 
border, especially the land border, both countries had to refer to the 1891 
Convention. In that Convention it was agreed upon that the border line ended 
at the eastern edge of Sebatik Island, so that the sovereignty over the small 
islands and the area to the East of Sebatik remained unclear. After many years 
of conflict on the sovereignty over Ligitan and Sipadan, both islands were 
finally handed over to Malaysia by the decision of ICJ (International Court 
of Justice) on 17 December 2002. However, the territorial dispute between 
Indonesia and Malaysia did not completely stop after the Ligitan and Sipadan 
lawsuit. It was followed by a political escalation because of the Ambalat 
maritime dispute in 2005 (Arsana 2005; Patmasari et al. 2008). Ambalat is not 
an island but a marine area/block to the east of Borneo with the coordinates of 
Map 2. Sebatik, Ambalat, Ligitan, Sipadan (Robert Cribb 2010, Digital atlas of 
Indonesian history). 
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118°15’21” - 118°51’15” E and 2°34’7” - 3°47’50” N, also known as Block ND6 
and ND7. If these coordinate are accurate, Ambalat covers a distance of 65 km 
from south to north and of 135 km from west to east. This also means that the 
block is situated below the border line crossing Sebatik Island (Arsana 2005).
Map 2 clearly shows the strategic importance of Sebatik as it faces and is 
closest to the disputed Ambalat. As to the case of the “lost” islands, Indonesia 
argued that they were part of Indonesia since they were located south of the 
continuation of the border which divides Sebatik Island. Patmasari et al. (2008) 
therefore suggests that the Ligitan and Sipadan case shows the crucial position 
of Sebatik with the consequence that the Indonesian government should pay 
more serious attention to it. 
People – state negotiation 
The “loss” of the Ligitan and Sipadan islands and the conflict over Ambalat 
opened a new phase in the relation between the state and the borderland(er)s. 
The government had become aware that issues like sovereignty, security, and 
pride to belong to a nation state, have their reflects in its borderlands such as 
Sebatik Island. The borderlanders are therefore expected to be the gatekeepers 
for their nation-state sovereignty. 
In 2005 President Yudhoyono visited Sebatik Island. After him came 
other important government officials. In 2008 for example, the celebration 
of Indonesia’s Independence Day in Sebatik was led for the first time by one 
of the government’s ministers, the Minister for Youth and Sports (Menteri 
Pemuda dan Olahraga), Adhyaksa Dault. In 2009 when the conflict with 
Malaysia became more and more serious, culminating in some incidents 
when Malaysia’s warships were regarded trespassing Indonesia’s territory 
in Ambalat, President Yudhoyono stated  “Daulat Ambalat Harga Mati” (Our 
sovereignty over Ambalat is the bottom line) (Kompas 3 June  2009). This 
statement had a large effect in Sebatik. Many people in Sebatik in interviews 
as well as in informal conversation repeated the statement again and again. 
Apparently their pride as Sebatik borderlanders close to Ambalat was very 
much triggered by the President’s statement. Some youth organizations in 
Sebatik actively supported the state’s programs. Some events that might be 
categorized as nationalist projects were arranged by the organizations or 
embraced as springing from their own initiative. Nationalist and patriotic 
slogans were spreading all over the Indonesian half of Sebatik Island     
However, the euphoria over nationalist projects did not directly bring 
significant changes for the island. The people are still living under conditions 
of poor infrastructures, problems of poverty, and dependence on Malaysia 
for their living. On one occasion the people expressed their disappointment 
by saying, “Everyone has come to Sebatik except Satan and the angels!” 
meaning that all the official visits had not changed anything for the Sebatiks. 
More concrete critique was ventured by the village head of Haji Kuning, Pak 
Zainuddin (47 years old) (see Footnote 2). He said: 
116 117Wacana, Vol. 13 No. 1 (April 2011) LINA PURYANTI AND SARKAWI B. HUSAIN, A people-state negotiation
Actually if it is said that we are about to take up arms against Malaysia, … that may 
be just politics, while we are here living in peace and keep good relations with them, 
for our life here depends on Malaysia. It remains for the Indonesian Government to 
decide how to offer facilities instead of creating barriers. The ringgit cannot simply 
be eliminated either, for it is basically just like in Jakarta where you can also pay with 
American dollars. The most important thing is the future of our fellow citizens who 
find themselves in the frontline. For it is uncertain whether the rupiah can be brought 
back to life and the ringgit be made hated […]. 
In this way Pak Zainuddin described the real situation in Sebatik Island 
very accurately. The relationship with Malaysia, for example, cannot only be 
viewed in terms of “us” versus “them”, as is suggested when people talk about 
national identity. The most important point raised by the interview is how 
the central government may improve life at the border, since that is the real 
life people there lead. It would be illusive to measure their nationalism only 
from their using the ringgit in daily life. The way Pak Zainuddin mockingly 
compared the ringgit in Sebatik with the dollar in Jakarta while people never 
bother to question Jakarta’s nationalism, is indeed ironic. This is the situation 
that Donnan and Haller (2000: 8) described, when they argued that a focus on 
borders can show how citizens relate to their nation-state in which loyalties 
are competing and multiple identities are managed on a daily basis, especially 
when there are economic disparities between two neighbouring countries 
like Indonesia and Malaysia in their border areas. Transnational relations do 
not preclude nationalism or loyalty to one’s state. In another interview the 
interviewee firmly stated that the Sebatik borderlanders do not need special 
lessons (from the state) to teach them how to defend the land in case of open 
warfare between Indonesia and Malaysia triggered by the Ambalat territorial 
dispute: “We are born here, live here, and maybe we will die here. No need 
to teach us how to defend ourselves. It is our land. We know how to defend 
our rights and our pride”. 
Support for the interests of the state vs. resistance, or more exactly critique 
against the state, is not the only perspective to view the situation in Sebatik. The 
two different attitudes cannot be easily considered either as the one showing 
loyalty and the other disloyalty. They might be viewed as part of a negotiation 
process by the local people to attract more attention in dealing with the state. 
Das and Poole (2004: 7) said that borderlands are also locations where people 
can employ and play with the rhetoric of the state with the intention to fulfil 
their own local aims. A construction of a border marker in Haji Kuning that 
was inaugurated on the 64th celebration of  Indonesia’s Independence Day 
may serve as an illustration.
Particularly noteworthy was that the plan to construct the new border 
marker  only two meters away from the state’s original  border marker and 
its  inauguration  ceremony did not come from the Government but from 
the borderlanders themselves, as various people there told us. A wide cross-
section of the population attended the ceremony, in which the role of the state 
apparatus – in the form of locally stationed troops and formally appointed 
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leaders – was limited to that of supportive bystanders. They acted as the 
people’s supportive agents in their determination to declare the applicability 
of Indonesia’s sovereignty in the region. In this way, the ceremony was 
significant as a local-grounded bottom-up undertaking, rather than as a 
top-down process. Indeed, the ceremony was led and guarded by military 
officers so that it could have been considered a military affair. However, the 
ceremony was considered a civil one since the inscription on the monument 
was signed by a local civilian, namely Haji Herman, a successful Buginese 
entrepreneur and well-known informal leader in Sebatik, who also delivered 
the official speech.  
The impression evoked by the event was that the existence of the border 
marker itself was part of the people’s appropriation of the state’s power for 
their own local purposes. The fact that the people have tight relations with 
Malaysia but at the same time cannot politically embrace Malaysian identity, 
makes them aware that Indonesia is the only country in which they are able 
to identify themselves as citizens. The possibility of daily transnational 
movement does not imply absolute freedom. The people cannot just move 
and ”disappear” to the other side after having crossed the border. They have 
to submit to the strict control of the two states when it comes to permanent 
immigration, which is illegal. Discrimination experienced in trading with 
Malaysia, and for instance the fact that even after several years of residence 
in Malaysia without the authorities ever issuing a proper Identity Card were 
some of the bad experiences with Malaysian officials people talked about. 
As the reactions were comparable to those described by Sahlins in relation to 
the border between France and Spain in the Pyrenees: “states did not simply 
impose the boundary or the nation on local society,” but it was rather the other 
way around,  local society bringing “the nation into the village” (Sahlins 1989: 
276). So, instead of resisting the state’s policies whose aim it was to turn Sebatik 
Island into a “front gallery” for the state’s sovereignty in the borderland and 
especially with regard to Ambalat, there was a localized process by which 
conceptualizations of and relationship to mechanisms of state control [we]re 
articulated, reaffirmed, resisted, and manipulated (Donnan and Wilson 2003: 
9). The inscription on the border marker that stated “Kokohkan Merah Putih 
di Tapal Batas” (Consolidate the Red and White Flag on the Border) strongly 
conveyed how the Sebatiks agreed to use the vernacular of the state and 
transform what it meant for the state to correspond to their local objectives.
Another example of such use of the rhetorics of the state for their local 
political interests is the Sebatik proposal to the central government in Jakarta 
in 2010 for “territorial administrative reform” (pemekaran wilayah). In this 
proposal that the need for territorial reform of Sebatik Island is emphasized, 
with the argument that that would enable the population to become more 
active participants and guardians in case the conflict over Ambalat would 
change into open warfare. The Sebatik people are willing to be the gatekeepers 
for the state’s sovereignty. However, although a year has passed now, they are 
still waiting for the central government‘s decision on Sebatik’s administrative 
118 119Wacana, Vol. 13 No. 1 (April 2011) LINA PURYANTI AND SARKAWI B. HUSAIN, A people-state negotiation
status. A factor contributing to this delay is the government’s decision to 
postpone evaluation of similar reforms in the whole of Indonesia. Yet the 
power of the state is still invoked by the local people in various ways. The 
question remains how long the Sebatiks (and other people in Indonesia’s 
border areas) still have to wait for improvement of their living conditions.
Conclusion
The situation in the Sebatik Island borderland is characterized by the 
interdependent relation with Malaysia in terms of long-standing economic 
and cultural ties. The situation has changed a bit since the territorial disputes 
over Ligitan and Sipadan Islands and the Ambalat block. The Indonesian 
state became (more) present in the island with its discourse on sovereignty 
and security of the state’s territory.  However, the presence of the state hasn’t 
effected in significant changes in the lives of the people. Therefore, in dealing 
with the situation the people of Sebatik Island showed various responses, 
ranging from support to critique. However, in the end the people chose to 
embrace the state’s interests by appropriating its rhetoric and localizing them 
as a form of negotiation for improving their lives.        
Interviews
Interview with Letnan Tony, 24 years, a commander of Pos Pam Perbatasan 
Indonesia - Malaysia (Yonif 613/RJA), 14 August 2009.
Interview with Mama Hamra, 54 years, Indonesian settler in Malaysia’s Sungai 
Melayu, 15 August 2009.
Interview with Mappangara, 44 years, owner of the house in Haji Kuning, 
14 August  2009.
Interview with Zainuddin, 47 years, the village head of Haji Kuning, 16 
August 2009.
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